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ECENT CASE

I

I

FOOD AND DRUG LAW-JUDICIAL LEGISLATIONBROADENING THE DEFINITION OF DRUG
TO INCLUDE MEDICAL DEVICES
AMP Incorporatedv. Gardner, No. 31829 (2d Cir., Feb. 13, 1968).
AMP Incorporated (AMP) developed two products which permit a new method of tying off, or ligating, severed blood vessels
during surgery. The only way blood vessels could be ligated before these products were introduced was to hand-tie ligatures
around severed vessels by means of a surgeon's knot. Both products consist of a disposable applicator, a nylon locking disk, and a
nylon ligating loop. Nylon is currently used in ligatures requiring
the hand-tying method. The disposable applicator can be either a
hemostat or a thin tube. With the aid of the applicator, the severed
vessel is closed by placing the nylon ligating loop around the
vessel. The nylon ligature is threaded through the locking disk to
form the loop. When the excess ligature material forming the
loop is pulled through the disk, the ligature is tightened around
the severed vessel. The disk then acts as a locking mechanism to
keep the ligature secure. The excess thread is cut away by a blade
which is an integral part of the applicator. The locking disk and
ligating thread remain in the body.
AMP requested that its products be classified by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA advised AMP that the
products were "new drugs." AMP felt that the products were "devices" within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act 1 (Act) and not "drugs"2 or "new drugs"' as defined by the Act.
AMP began to follow the provisions of the Act pertaining to devices. Because the FDA threatened seizure if AMP did not comply
with the "drug" and "new drug" provisions, AMP sought a judgment declaring its products "devices" and an injunction barring
seizure of its products. The District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the products should be classified as "new drugs" and granted summary judgment to defendants. 4 The Second Circuit affirmed in AMP Incorporated v. Gardner.5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1938).
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1938).
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1938).
AMP Incorporated v. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
No. 31829 (2d Cir., Feb. 13, 1968).
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Two questions were presented in this case. First, were the
products "drugs" or "devices"? Second, if they were "drugs," were
they "new drugs"? Devices and standard approved drugs may be
placed into interstate commerce without the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. "New drugs," however,
must go through rigorous approval procedures established by the
government 6 which may delay production for several years. AMP
was therefore interested in having its product classified as a
"device."
From the outset the court of appeals assumed arguendo that
the disposable applicators were devices. The nylon ligating thread
and locking disk were the components which the court felt created
the controversy. 7 The current relevant provisions of section 321
of the Act defining "drug," "device" and "new drug" are as follows:
(g) (1) The term "drug" means
(A) articles recognized in the official United States
Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of
them; and
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
in man or other animals; and
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect
the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals; and
(D) articles intended for use as a component of any
article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C) of
this paragraph; but does not include devices or
their components, parts,or accessories.8
(h) The term "device"

. . .

means instruments, apparatus,

and contrivances, including their components, parts,
and accessories, intended
(1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat6. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(i) (1938).
These subsections of section 355 require any person who wants to introduce
a new drug into interstate commerce to file an application with the FDA
and to get approval from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
before the drug may be marketed. Once the drug has been approved it
may be shipped without filing subsequent applications. Devices need no
such approval.
Devices and drugs which have received approval are both regulated,
however, under sections 351, pertaining to adulterated drugs and devices;
352, pertaining to misbranded drugs and devices; and 353, pertaining to
exemptions of drugs and devices. Thus, a device which is adulterated or
misbranded may be seized and taken out of interstate commerce by the
FDA.
7. No. 31829 (2d Cir. 1968) at 4.
8. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1938) (emphasis added).
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ment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals; or
(2) to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals.9
(p) The term "new drug" means(1) Any drug the composition of which is such that
such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the labeling thereof, . . . or
(2) Any drug the composition of which is such that
such drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use under
such conditions, has become so recognized, but
which has not, otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent
or for a
10
material time under such conditions.
Nylon sutures are listed in the official United States Pharmacopoeia." Thus, it would appear that nylon ligatures are drugs
because the Act defines drugs as articles recognized in the Pharmacopoeia.12 A complete reading of the section defining a drug, however, shows that devices are specifically exempted from the definition. 3 Therefore, even if the article is listed in the Pharmacopoeia, it may be a device and not a drug. The reasoning becomes
circuitous. The definition of a drug or a device can only be obtained from statutory interpretation based upon legislative history.
The plain meaning of the provision defining a drug clearly
indicates that drugs and devices are mutually exclusive. A drug
cannot also be a device. The district court said that the ligating
loop and disk "are arguably either articles or instruments, apparatus and contrivances ... capable of coming within [the] two definitions, [drug and device] .... ,,14 This reasoning is clearly erroneous
9. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1938).
10. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1938).
11. UNITED STATES PHARMACOPOEIA 691 (17th rev. ed. 1965).

12. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (A) (1938).
13. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (D) (1938).
14. AMP Incorporated v. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). Supporting the contention that a device cannot arguably be a drug
is a discussion on the floor of the Senate between Senator Clark (Missouri)
and Senator Copeland (New York), who introduced the bill. Senator
Clark:
Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from New York how
he can reconcile the language of this section and the language of
the amendment with the common, ordinary acceptation of the
English language. In other words, here he says it is proper to

describe as a drug "all substances, preparations, and devices intended for use in the diagnosis cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals." In other words, if a
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since devices are explicitly excluded from the definition of a drug.
The actual point of interpretation, as the court of appeals recognized, was how broad the definition of a drug should be. AMP was
contending that the nylon thread and disk were component parts
of an admitted device, the applicator, thereby making them devices. 15

The FDA was contending that the applicator was a com-

ponent part of the nylon thread and disk, allegedly drugs, thereby
man has invented a shoulder brace, a purely mechanical device,
which he claims will straighten a man's shoulders and expand
his chest and make for his health, according to the definition
contained in this paragraph it has to be described as a drug aAd
treated in law as a drug.
74 CONG. REC. 4841 (1935) (remarks of Senator Clark). In these remarks
Senator Clark was referring to S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), which
did not then distinguish between drugs and devices. The predecessors of
S. 5 also did not make such a distinction. S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(b) (1933).
Senator Copeland answered Senator Clark by saying:
The Senator from New York would have no objection to the proposal about the particular devices mentioned by the Senator. But
there are on the market a great many devices which are offered
for use, and citizens are exploited believing that they can be
cured of all sorts of ailments by the use of them. For example,
there is such a thing as a radium belt carrying a disk alleged to
contain radium; it is claimed that if the Senator from Missouri
should wear that belt he would never have appendicitis or gallbladder disease or perhaps any other ailment.
74 CONG. REC. 4841 (1935) (remarks of Senator Copeland).
Senator Clark replied:
Speaking for myself alone, I have no disposition to attack every
word in the bill; but we are legislating on a very important
matter. As I see it, what the Senator from New York is doing in
this particular case is the same thing as if the Congress of the
United States should attempt to say by law that calling a sheep's
tail a leg would make it a leg. In other words, the Senator from
New York in this language is attempting to define a wholly mechanical device as a drug. I say it is bad legislation; that if he
desires to legislate against these mechanical devices he ought to do
it in the open instead of indirection and attempting to define as a
drug something which palpably is not a drug.
74 CONG. REc. 4841 (1935) (remarks of Senator Clark).
I am opposed to enacting an absurdity. It is absurd to declare a
device a drug to begin with, and it is still more absurd to declare
such a device as a scale a drug.
74 CONG. REc. 4843 (1935) (remarks of Senator Clark).
My objection goes to putting the Congress of the United States in
the ridiculous, absurd, and asinine position of defining a purely mechanical device as a "drug." My objection to this particular
amendment is to taking in the bill that ridiculous position and embodying in it such a definition.
74 CONG. R.c. 4844, 4845 (1935) (remarks of Senator Clark). Seemingly as
a result of this exchange the bill was amended as S. 5, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937), the current enactment which distinguishes between drugs and
devices. For a discussion of this amendment see DuNN, FEmiL. FooD,
DRUG AND

COSMETIc ACT-

A

STATEMENT

OF ITS

LEGIsLATrIvE RECORD 477

(1938).
15. See AMP Incorporated v. Gardner, No. 31829 (2d Cir. 1968) at 4
n.3, 10 n.13.
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making the entire product a drug within the meaning of the
Act.10
In this matter of definition certain quotations from the legislative history of the Act are pertinent. During hearings on the
bill which was finally enacted, Dr. William C. Woodward, then
Legislative Counsel for the American Medical Association, was
asked what the term "devices" included. He answered:
The term is broad enough to include-well, we will say
trusses. I would say it is broad enough to include eyeglasses, checking up on the lenses; and clinical thermometers, possibly; catgut used in surgical work; surgical instruments; particularly, however, electrical devices, ultraviolet ray devices, and things of that sort; electrical
belts, and a thousand and one things that are sold at the
present time without any regulation at all and that are
utterly fraudulent."
These remarks went unchallenged by the subcommittee. Although
catgut was specifically mentioned, the witness emphasized the
"quack" devices which, at the time the Act was passed, were
polluting the country. Indeed, when Senator Copeland introduced
a predecessor of the final bill, he noted that these quack devices
had to be controlled.18 ' The importance attached to quack devices
prompted the court of appeals to say in regard to the separate
definitions of drugs and devices:
We have found nothing in the legislative history of the
Act indicating that the Congressional purpose in providing a separate definition of "devices" was anything other
than to avoid the incongruity of classifying such things as
electric belts as "drugs." There Was at the time no practical significance to the distinction between "drugs" and
"devices" for the operative provisions of the bill (e.g., the
provision barring the introduction into interstate commerce
of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated
or misbranded) applied identicallyto both. 9
This language does not say that a drug could also be a device. It
16. Id.""
17. Hearings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941, and S. 5 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 319-20 (1935).
18. Senator Copeland:
The present law defines drugs as substances or mixtures of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention
of disease. This narrow definition permits escape from legal con..trol of all therapeutic or curative devices like electric belts, for
example. It also permits, the escape of -preparations which are
intended to alter the structure or some function of the body, as
for example, preparations intended to reduce excessive weight.
There are many worthless and some dangerous devices and preparations falling within these classifications. S. 2800 contains ample authority to control them.
78 CONG. REc. 8960 (1934) (remarks of Senator Copeland).
19. No. 31829 (2d Cir. 1968) at 7.
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only suggests that at the time of passage of the Act drugs and
devices were regulated by the same provisions of the Act.
A practical distinction soon developed, however, with the passage of the "new drug" provisions which require government approval before new drugs can be introduced into interstate commerce. 20 The Act contains no similar provision for new devices.
The court of appeals answered this problem by noting that the
"new drug" provisions were not incorporated until after the definitions had been drawn up. 21 Therefore the court reasoned that
the term "new drug" was used "without any attention to the
fact that the distinction between 'drug' and 'device' had thus for
the first time become important. 2 12 The court recognized that
the only significance in classifying the product as a "device" instead of a "drug" was to avoid the "new drug" provisions if the
product was a drug. Since this was the only importance attached
to the distinction, the court looked to policy in making its decision
and found it in the noble, but unsubstantiated, need to protect
the unknowing public's health. AMP's products were "drugs"
and not "devices" because the purpose of the Act was "to keep
inadequately tested medical and related products which might
cause widespread danger to human life out of interstate com23
merce."
After the court determined that the products were "drugs,"
it held that they were also "new drugs." The reasoning was that
although nylon sutures had been in use for an extended period,
the novel means of employing the nylon thread and nylon disk
made them new drugs. 24 To support its rationale for classifying
the products as drugs, the court expressed the policy reasons for
considering them to be "new drugs": "We would, moreover, be
reluctant to give a narrow construction to this statute [referring to
25
the "new drug" provisions], touching the public health as it does."
Although the court acknowledged that the "new drug" provisions
were precipitated by the death of several persons after using
"Elixir Sulfanimide," 26 a drug in the pharmacological sense, it con20.
21.

Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938).
No. 31829 (2d Cir. 1968) at 8. See also DUNN,

FEDERAL FOOD,
DRUG AND- COSMETIc: AcT-A STATEMENT OF ITS. LEGIsLATIvE REcORD 1316-27

(1938).
22. No. 31829 (2d Cir. 1968) at 8.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4 n.3:

The applicator is the embodiment of a new method of applying
the ligature, which is the basis of the defendants' "new drug" conclusion. 21 C.F.R. § 130.1(h) provides: "The newness of a drug
may arise by reason (among other reasons) of: .

.

. (5)

The new-

ness of a dosage, or method or duration of administration or application. . .

."

And see Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418,

421 (D. D.C. 1958).
25.
26.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 8-9.
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cluded that congressional intent must have been to give the words
the broadest possible meaning. The court's final interpretation was
that "[the exclusionary classification 'devices' should, we think,
be limited to such things as Congress expressly intended it to
cover. '"27 Hence "devices" would now apparently include the quack
devices and such things as office scales and, from this opinion,
hemostats and long thin tubes. 28 Beyond that only students of
legislative history should tread.
This opinion merits comment for its questionable reasoning
which borders on judicial legislation. The same court of appeals
has said concerning statutory interpretation: "What is more to the
point, as we are in this case interpreting legislative enactment, it
is our duty to try to discover and carry out the legislative purpose, not to inject our own notions of desirable policy ...
29 The
court in this decision has not taken its own advice. By stating
that the only things which are "devices" within the meaning of
the Act are those things specifically intended to be so by Congress, the court has opened the door to a flood of litigation because
of the vagueness of the phrase. Now certain devices, not specifically intended by Congress to be devices, are drugs-but
which devices? The AMP loop and disk perform a purely mechanical operation; they are, however, left in the body. Is the
test-articles which are left in the body are drugs? Certainly, this
test would seem to protect the public health of which the court of
appeals spoke. In this particular case, however, the "public danger" cry is a bark without a bite. Both AMP and the FDA agreed
that there had never been a reported case of an implant in the
human body causing any 3carcinogenic
effect, including schrapnel,
0
pins, sutures and ligatures.
A bill introduced in the House of Representatives on June 8,
1967, which is supported by the FDA, is entitled: "A Bill to protect the public health by amending the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act to assure the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of
medical devices." 3'
This bill proposes government approval of
devices before they are marketed. Included under "therapeutic
27.

Id. at 9.

28. At page 4 of the opinion, the court assumes arguendo that the
applicators are devices. Two other cases have made the drug-device distinction. In one a metal pin that was to be left in the body was determined to be a "device" within the meaning of the current Act. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960). In the other case
gauze bandages were found to be a "drug." This case, however, was decided prior to passage of the current act when no distinction was made
between drugs and devices. See United States v. 48 Dozen Packages of
Gauze 'Bandage, 94 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1938).
29. Ingo v. Koch, 127 F.2d 667, 678 (2d Cir. 1942).
30. Brief for Appellant at 13, AMP Incorporated v. Gardner, No. 31829
(2d Cir., Feb. 13, 1968).
31. H.R. 10726, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (excerpt from the preamble).
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devices" are devices "intended to be secured or otherwise placed,
in whole or in part, within the human body or into a body cavity,
or directly in contact with mucous membrane, and is intended to
be left in the body or such cavity, or in such direct contact, per32
manently, indefinitely, or for a substantial period or periods."
It is strange indeed that the Congress which thirty years ago included ligatures and other devices to be left in the body within its
"drug" and "new drug" definitions should move for double coverage under a new provision. The logical inference, of course, is
that the Act does not currently include such mechanical devices
in its "drug" definition. Since they are not so included, neither
can they be "new drugs." It would appear that the Second Circuit
has hastened the legislative process.
The better reasoning in this case would have been to recognize
that the AMP products performed a purely mechanical operation,
thereby making them devices. By so doing the court would not
have had to strain to find that public policy distinguished a drug
from a device. The court has substantially expanded the power of
the FDA by allowing more products to come within the "new
drug" provisions. From a policy viewpoint this may not be a bad
result, but there is no basis in law for the decision. The better
course would have been a plea to the legislature and a recognition
of judicial limitation.
GARY R. MYI

32.

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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